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Abstract
This article uses a linked sample of World War I Army veterans from the state of Missouri to study the impact of
vocational rehabilitation on labor market outcomes for men wounded and disabled during the war. Veterans’
military service abstracts are linked to the 1940 US Census and a subset are linked to rehabilitation records. This
creates a new dataset that contains information on military service, rehabilitation, and labor market outcomes. I
find that 70 percent of veterans that were both wounded in action and disabled when discharged from the army
participated in the rehabilitation program. These same veterans had significantly better labor market outcomes,
which can be attributed to the rehabilitation program under certain assumptions.
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Introduction
World War I was a watershed in the history of warfare. It was the first war that saw widespread use of aircrafts,
flamethrowers, machine guns, poison gas, and tanks. It was also the first war in which medical technology was
sufficiently advanced to keep many wounded soldiers alive (Gabriel and Metz Gabriel and Metz 1992). In
particular, World War I was the first war for which the number of Americans that were wounded in action
outnumbered the dead. During World War I there were about 1.75 wounded American service members for
each one that died, which was a significant improvement on the 0.77 wounded-to-dead ratio for the American
Civil War.1 Even if the reporting of wounds and deaths was not entirely consistent across wars, it seems likely
that more wounded service members were kept alive during World War I than during any previous war in which
the United States was involved.
Americans correctly anticipated the challenge of returning these wounded and disabled veterans to civilian life
and in 1917 Congress passed the War Risk Insurance Act (WRIA), which guaranteed disabled veterans the right
to vocational rehabilitation and represented a major break from the veteran benefits that came before it (The
President’s Commission 1956: 130). As Beth Linker writes, “From America’s earliest wars to those of the second
half of the nineteenth century, soldiers permanently injured in the line of duty received a lifetime of monetary
reimbursement in the form of federal pensions, without any explicit demand of returning to gainful employment
or a life of self-sufficiency” (Linker Linker 2011: 2). By passing the WRIA, Congress hoped to reduce the
government’s financial burden from veterans’ pensions by returning disabled veterans to gainful employment.
This article represents the first attempt, to my knowledge, to empirically assess whether the World War I
rehabilitation program was successful in its goals.
To study the impact of World War I vocational rehabilitation on veterans’ labor market outcomes I collected
data from the Abstracts of World War I Military Service for all army servicemen from the state of Missouri. These
abstracts provide information on service members names, age, birthplace, wounds received in action, and
disabilities when discharged from the army. With this information I separate veterans into four mutually
exclusive categories: (1) veterans that were not wounded in action and not disabled when discharged; (2)
veterans that were wounded in action but not disabled when discharged; (3) veterans that were not wounded in
action but were disabled when discharged; and (4) veterans that were both wounded in action and disabled
when discharged.2
The servicemen from these abstracts were then linked forward to the 1940 US Census to obtain long-run labor
market outcomes. Finally, I linked a random subset of veterans to the United States Veterans Administration
Master Index, 1917–1940, which provides information on whether a veteran was rehabilitated. The resulting
dataset provides information on veterans’ military service and long-run labor market outcomes and a subset of
the data contains information about rehabilitation status.
I present three main results in this article. First, veterans that were both wounded in action and disabled when
discharged were the most likely to participate in the vocational rehabilitation program. In particular, only 2
percent of veterans who were not wounded and not disabled participated in the program. Between 14 and 20
percent of veterans that were either wounded or disabled, but not both, participated. In contrast, 70 percent of
veterans that were both wounded and disabled participated in the rehabilitation program. This high percentage
of participation among wounded and disabled veterans is due to the fact that only veterans that could display a
permanent disability linked to their military service were eligible to participate in the program.

Second, veterans that were either wounded in action or disabled at discharge, but not both, had labor market
outcomes that were significantly worse than their nonwounded, nondisabled peers. However, veterans that
were both wounded and disabled saw significant improvements in their labor market outcomes. They had
significantly higher wages, had higher occupational standings, were less likely to be laborers, and were more
likely to be white-collar workers. The identifying assumptions required to attribute these results to these
veterans’ eligibility for the rehabilitation program likely hold, although some are untestable.
Third, using the subset of veterans for which I have actual rehabilitation data, I compare the outcomes of
veterans that were rehabilitated with those that were not. Veterans that were wounded in action or disabled at
discharge and participated in the rehabilitation program had better outcomes than their wounded and disabled
peers that did not participate.
Although this article studies a historical rehabilitation program the findings are of contemporary interest. With
military conflicts persisting around the world, studying veterans’ rehabilitation remains of great importance. For
example, the Veterans Administration (VA) is currently attempting to rehabilitate many veterans from America’s
recent wars in their Vocational Rehabilitation & Employment program (VR&E). This program is the direct
successor of, and shares many features with, the World War I rehabilitation program studied in this article.
This article contributes to two literatures. This first is the literature about the effect of military service on
veterans’ long-run outcomes. Numerous papers have studied the impact of military service on labor market
outcomes. Tan (Tan 2020) studies the effect of World War I military service on economic status, while Laschever
(Laschever 2013) focuses on social networks and employment. Angrist (Angrist 1990), Angrist and Krueger
(Angrist and Krueger 1994), and Hirsch and Mehay (Hirsch and Mehay 2003) study the impact of military service
on wages. In addition, Autor et al. (Autor, Mark, Kyle and Lyle 2016) and Coile et al. (Coile, Mark and Audrey
2015) study the impact of the VA’s disability compensation program on labor force participation rates and wages
for disabled veterans of more recent conflicts. Other studies have examined the effect of military service on
nonlabor market outcomes such as educational attainment (Angrist Angrist 1993; Angrist and Chen Angrist and
Chen 2011; Bound and Turner Bound and Sarah 2002), health (Bedard and Deschênes Bedard and Olivier 2006;
Costa Costa 2012; Costa and Kahn Costa and Kahn 2010) and housing (Fetter Fetter 2013; Hausman Hausman
2016). I extend this literature by focusing on the labor market return to rehabilitation. In addition, the results of
this article demonstrate that veterans’ heterogenous wartime experiences matter for long-run outcomes. While
there are exceptions (see Costa and Kahn Costa and Kahn 2007, Costa and Kahn 2010), most of the previous
literature has focused on estimating the return to veteran status and has not taken into account heterogenous
wartime experiences, such as disabilities resulting from military service.
This article also contributes to the literature about World War I rehabilitation. World War I was the first war that
involved a systematic effort to rehabilitate wounded and disabled veterans. Along with Beth Linker’s seminal
work (Linker Linker 2011, Linker 2016), many others have written about the topic (Anderson and Perry Anderson
and Perry 2014; Carden-Coyne Carden-Coyne 2007; Kinder Kinder 2015; Malone Malone 2013). This article
extends this literature by providing an empirical analysis of the labor market outcomes for veterans that were
rehabilitated.

Historical Background: World War I Vocational Rehabilitation
Rehabilitating wounded and disabled veterans to help them reintegrate into the civilian labor market was of
particular interest during World War I. Europe had been at war for nearly three years before the United States
entered the conflict and Americans knew that medical advances were keeping many wounded soldiers alive, but
with disabilities. The discovery of sodium citrate as an effective anticoagulant allowed for the first successful
battlefield blood transfusions. X-ray machines saw widespread use during surgery to remove bullets and

shrapnel. The use of mobile bacteriology laboratories allowed surgeons to test bacteria counts before closing a
wound and the introduction of Carrel–Dakin’s solution greatly reduced mortality due to wound infection
(Gabriel and Metz Gabriel and Metz 1992). In addition, motorized ambulances allowed wounded soldiers to be
quickly transported from the front lines to a hospital.
The large number of wounded and disabled service members that were anticipated to return from the war
created a problem for the United States’ federal government. By 1915, Civil War pensions had ballooned in cost
to more than $200 million annually or approximately 25 percent of federal expenditures (Linker Linker 2011).
Glasson (Glasson 1918) reports that Civil War pensions had cost the federal government about $5 billion in total
and there was little desire to extend these generous pension benefits to service members returning home from
World War I. Accordingly, in 1917 Congress passed, and President Wilson signed, the WRIA. This act provided
five basic benefits to World War I veterans: “(1) Support for the dependents of members of the Armed Forces
during service; (2) low-cost life insurance on a voluntary basis; (3) compensation for the war-disabled and for the
dependents of the dead; (4) vocational rehabilitation for the disabled, and (5) medical and hospital care” (The
President’s Commission 1956: 25–26).
The goal of vocational rehabilitation was to train disabled veterans for a specific job so they could be gainfully
employed. Disabled veterans could undertake two types of rehabilitation training: education or placement.
Education training usually took place in a school and placement training placed veterans in “an apprentice like
arrangement for a specific job” (The President’s Commission 1956: 131). The placement training “was found to
be the best form of training for a great many vocations” and veterans often trained with firms who guaranteed
employment after training was complete (Thurber 1944: 18). During the course of training wounded and
disabled veterans were paid a stipend of $100 a month if they had no dependents and $120 a month if they had
dependents. Figure 1 displays a 1919 poster from the American Red Cross that advertised the rehabilitation
program.

Figure 1. American Red Cross rehabilitation advertisement. Source: Chambers (1919). Retrieved from the Library
of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2002708940/.

By the time the program ended in 1928 a total of 675,000 veterans applied for rehabilitation, 337,000 were
deemed eligible and admitted to the program, 180,000 entered training, and 129,000 completed the program.
More than 3,500 educational institutions, 30,000 businesses, and 6,000 farms took part in the training. In total,
$645 million were spent rehabilitating disabled veterans, which was considerably less than the $5 billion spent
on Civil War pensions. In addition, about 79 percent of this was spent on stipends for the disabled veterans; a
cost that would have been incurred even in the absence of the program, since disabled veterans were entitled
to a pension. Thus, the actual tuition and administrative costs of the program were only $135 million
(Dillingham Dillingham 1952). A 1956 report to President Eisenhower claims that the program was a great
success. Government representatives “maintained contacts with employers to secure their cooperation” in
hiring rehabilitated veterans and “in general employment representatives were successful in placing trainees”
(The President’s Commission 1956: 131). By the end of the program in 1928, 97 percent of rehabilitated
veterans had been successfully placed in gainful employment.3
To determine if the vocational rehabilitation program was successful at reintegrating veterans into the civilian
labor market it is important to understand who was eligible to participate in the program. The WRIA specified
that veterans would be rehabilitated “in cases of dismemberment, of injuries to sight or hearing, and of other
injuries commonly causing permanent disability” (The War Risk Insurance Act 1917). The WRIA provided the
mandate for rehabilitation, but the Vocational Rehabilitation Act (VRA) of 1918 filled in the actual details. This
act specified that a veteran could be rehabilitated if he was “disabled under circumstances entitling him … to
compensation under Article III of the [War Risk Insurance] Act … and who, after his discharge, in the opinion of
the board, is unable to carry on a gainful occupation, to resume his former occupation, or to enter upon some
other occupation” (VRA 1918). Thus, whether a veteran was eligible to participate in the rehabilitation program
was decided on a case-by-case basis by the Federal Board for Vocational Education (Thurber Thurber 1946)
starting in 1919.4 The eligibility for rehabilitation was extended in 1919 when the VRA was amended to include
any veteran who developed a disability after discharge that was determined to have originated from their
military service. It was also no longer required that the disability change a veteran’s vocational aptitude. Finally,
the World War Adjusted Compensation Act of 1924 further extended rehabilitation to any veteran who
developed a disability prior to July 2, 1921 that was determined to be connected to their military service.
As mentioned in the preceding text, the WRIA also provided monetary compensation to disabled veterans. Due
to the unpopularity of veteran pensions during the World War I era, the WRIA changed the name of payments to
veterans from “pension” to “compensation.” The compensation program began by paying permanently disabled
veterans $30 a month or $360 a year, which was “a low rate of compensation” (The President’s
Commission 1956: 28). It went through several phases of liberalization and economy during the 1920s and
1930s. By 1939 (the year for which I observe labor market outcomes), payments had reverted to being called
pensions, which were only made available to veterans under strict conditions. Veterans had to have 90 days of
service, part of which must have been during the war, an honorable discharge, permanent and total disability
not of their own cause, and demonstrate income less than $1,000 a year if single or less than $2,500 a year if
married or had dependent children. If a veteran met these criteria, they would be eligible to receive a pension of
$40 a month or $480 a year.

Data
World War I provides a unique opportunity to study the effect of vocational rehabilitation on veterans’ labor
market outcomes due to publicly available data. Three data sources were used in this article.
The first is Abstracts of World War I Military Service. These abstracts record a veteran’s name, race, address of
residence, place and date of enlistment or induction into the armed forces, city and state (or country) of birth,
age or date of birth, ranks and dates of promotions, engagements, whether wounded in action, the range of

dates served overseas, the date discharged from the armed forces, disability status when discharged, and
whether the soldier was awarded any citations for exceptional conduct or valor. Panel A of figure 2 displays a
service abstract for Joseph Henry Prior, who was a private that was severely wounded in action. The phrase “In
view of occupation he was, on date of discharge, reported Y per cent disabled” means that Joseph Henry Prior
was disabled when he was discharged from the army. When there is an “N,” rather than a “Y,” the veteran was
not disabled when discharged.

Figure 2. Service abstract and master index card. Panel A: World War I military service abstract for Joseph Henry
Prior. Panel B: Master index card for Joseph Henry Prior. Sources: Panel A is a picture from the Abstracts of
World War I Military Service for the state of Missouri, which were accessed from the Missouri Digital Heritage
Collection (2020). Panel B is a picture of an index card from the United States Veterans Administration Master
Index, 1917–1940 provided by FamilySearch (2020).
I collected abstracts for every army service member from the state of Missouri from the Missouri Digital
Heritage Collection (2020). As shown in panel A of figure 2, these abstracts had already been digitized by the
Missouri State Archives so I was able to obtain abstracts for all 141,671 men from the state that served in the
army during World War I.5 Of this sample, only 100,889 had information on their birthplace, which is important
for finding the veteran in the 1940 census.
The second data source used is the 1940 U.S. Census. I link veterans from their military service abstracts to the
1940 census to obtain long-run labor market outcomes. To perform the linking I use the ABE algorithm, which is

commonly used in economics and was developed by Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (Abramitzky et
al. Abramitzky, Boustan and Katherine 2012, Abramitzky, Boustan and Katherine 2014, Abramitzky, Boustan and
Katherine 2019a) and is similar to the algorithm used in Ferrie (Ferrie 1996) and Long and Ferrie (Long and
Joseph 2013). I begin by adjusting first names for common nicknames and then standardize each first and
surname using the NYSIIS algorithm, which transforms a name into a phonetic code. I then restrict the sample to
veterans who are unique by NYSIIS first name, NYSIIS surname, birthplace, birth year, and race. Using these
variables, I search for each veteran in the 1940 census. If a unique match is found the observation is declared to
be a match. If multiple matches are found the observation is discarded. If no match is found then I continue to
search for individuals who match exactly on NYSIIS first name, NYSIIS surname, birthplace, and race, but allow
birth year to differ by up to one year (e.g., if a veteran reports a birth year of 1899 I will search for individuals in
the 1940 census with a birth year of 1898 and 1900). If still no unique match is found then I continue to search
for individuals who match exactly on NYSIIS first name, NYSIIS surname, birthplace, and race but allow birth year
to differ by up to two years. I searched for 100,899 veterans from Missouri and I was able to successfully link
42,652 of them or 42 percent. While there are several different linking algorithms currently being used in
economics, Abramitzky et al. (Abramitzky, Boustan, Eriksson, Feigenbaum and Pérez 2019b) show that
automated methods, including the one used in this article, result in low false positive rates and similar
coefficient estimates relative to a hand linked sample.6
The final data set used was the United States Veterans Administration Master Index, 1917–1940 provided by
FamilySearch (2020). This collection contains index cards with information on approximately 5.7 million veterans
who made (or whose heirs made) claims for veteran benefits between 1917 and 1940. These cards are
particularly valuable for this project because they contain information on whether a veteran participated in the
vocational rehabilitation program. While the names of the veterans in the VA Master Index have been digitized
and are searchable, the information on rehabilitation status has not been digitized. Accordingly, veterans had to
be searched for by hand. I searched for 3,500 randomly selected veterans from the linked dataset and was able
to successfully find master index cards for 2,848 (81 percent) of them.7 Panel B of figure 2 shows the master
index card for Joseph Henry Prior. The fact that there are numbers next to the letter “R” means that he was in
the vocational rehabilitation program.
A concern with any linked sample is whether it is representative of the overall population. Table 1 addresses this
concern by comparing a number of characteristics for veterans that were successfully linked to the entire
sample of veterans that I attempted to link. Column (1) displays the average for veterans that were successfully
linked, while column (2) displays the average for all veterans that I attempted to link. Column (3) displays the pvalue from a test of the equality of means between columns (1) and (2). Veterans that were successfully linked
were slightly older, more likely to have an enlisted rank, less likely to have a specialist rank, and more likely to
have been born in the state of Missouri. The differences between the successfully linked sample and the sample
that I attempted to link are small in magnitude, even when they are significantly different. For example, 88.1
percent of my linked sample had an enlisted rank, while 86.4 percent of the sample that I attempted to link had
an enlisted rank.
Table 1. Comparison of successfully linked veterans with the entire sample that was attempted to link
Successfully
Attempted to
p-value of
linked
link
difference: (1)-(2)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Birth year
1892.99
1892.74
0.000
Enlisted ranka
.881
.864
0.000
b
Commissioned officers
.059
.057
0.286
Specialist ranksc
.030
.044
0.000

Wounded in action
.054
0.53
0.222
Disabled at discharge
.074
.076
0.075
Wounded in action and disabled at discharge
.014
.013
0.439
Born in Missouri
.739
.720
0.000
Observations
42,652
100,889
Source: Data are from the Abstracts of World War I Military Service for the state of Missouri, which were
accessed from the Missouri Digital Heritage Collection (2020).
Notes: Column (3) reports the p-value from a test of the equality of means between columns (1) and (2).
a
Enlisted ranks include corporals, privates, and sergeants.
b
Commissioned officers include 2nd lieutenants, 1st lieutenants, captains, majors, and colonels.
c
Specialist ranks include band leaders, buglers, cooks, farriers, mechanics, musicians, saddlers, and wagoners.
Summary statistics for veterans that were linked are presented in table 2. Column (1) shows summary statistics
for the entire sample of veterans that were linked to the 1940 census. Note that not all veterans have
information on income and occupation, so a smaller sample of veterans was used for the statistics on weekly
wage, constructed income score, and OCC score. About 5 percent of veterans were wounded in action, 7.4
percent were disabled when discharged, and 1.4 percent were both wounded and disabled. Column (2) shows
summary statistics for the subset of veterans whose VA master index card I found. About 5 percent of veterans
were rehabilitated. Finally, column (3) displays the p-value from a test of the equality of means between
columns (1) and (2). Veterans with rehabilitation data had slightly fewer years of schooling and were slightly
more likely have an enlisted rank and less likely to be a commissioned officer. Otherwise, there were no
significant differences between the entire sample of linked veterans and the sample whose VA master index
card I found, meaning that the sample with rehabilitation data should be representative of the larger sample.
This is, of course, expected because I randomly selected 3,500 veterans to search for rehabilitation data for.
Table 2. Summary statistics

Full sample

Sample with
rehabilitation data
(2)
.905
35.61
1332.17
26.46
.136
.471

p-value of
difference: (1)-(2)
(3)
0.171
0.795
0.581
0.465
0.544
0.721

(1)
In labor force
.912
Weekly wagea
34.44
Constructed income scoreb
1339.57
OCC scorec
26.63
Laborer
.132
White-collar worker (clerk, manager, professional,
.474
salesman)
Age in 1940
47.00
46.96
0.646
Years of schooling
8.44
8.27
0.022
d
Enlisted rank
.881
.895
0.019
Commissioned officerse
.03
.022
0.016
f
Specialist ranks
.059
.057
0.654
Wounded in action
.054
.053
0.891
Disabled at discharge
.074
.073
0.857
Wounded in action and disabled at discharge
.014
.015
0.587
Rehabilitated
N/A
.05
Observations
42,652
2,848
Sources: Data are from the 1940 US Census (labor market outcomes and years of schooling) and the Abstracts of
World War I Military Service (military service information), which were accessed from the Missouri Digital

Heritage Collection (2020). The rehabilitation information is from the United States Veterans Administration
Master Index, 1917–1940 provided by FamilySearch (2020).
Notes: Column (3) reports the p-value from a test of the equality of means between columns (1) and (2).
a
Weekly wages are only calculated for veterans that worked more than 30 weeks and reported being a wage
worker. Thus, the number of observations used to calculate the weekly wages statistics are different from the
number reported in each column. In column (1) 20,708 observations are used to calculate weekly wages and in
column (2) 1,345 observations are used.
b
Constructed income is only calculated for veterans in an occupational, sex, region, race, and worker class (selfemployed vs. wage worker) cell for which I was able to successfully construct income from the 5 percent IPUMS
sample of the 1960 census. Thus, the number of observations used to calculate the constructed income score
statistics are different from the number reported in each column. In column (1) 38,830 observations are used to
calculate constructed income and in column (2) 2,565 observations are used.
c
OCC Score is only calculated for veterans for which OCC score was not zero (zero means not applicable
according to IPUMS). Thus, the number of observations used to calculate OCC score statistics are different from
the number reported in each column. In column (1) 39,428 observations are used to calculate OCC score and in
column (2) 2,617 observations are used.
d
Enlisted ranks include corporals, privates, and sergeants.
e
Commissioned officers include 2nd lieutenants, 1st lieutenants, captains, majors, and colonels.
f
Specialist ranks include band leaders, buglers, cooks, farriers, mechanics, musicians, saddlers, and wagoners.

Determinants of Rehabilitation
This section explores the determinants of veterans being rehabilitated. As discussed in the “Historical
Background” section, the WRIA and the VRA made rehabilitation available to disabled veterans that could not
resume their former job or carry on gainful employment. However, eligibility for the program was decided on a
case-by-case basis by the Federal Board for Vocational Education (Thurber Thurber 1946). The board decided
whether a veteran was eligible for rehabilitation when they applied to the program, which might have occurred
anytime between 1919 and 1928. Thus, it is possible that many of the veterans that I observe being disabled
when discharged from the army were not, later on, deemed eligible for the rehabilitation program by the board.
It is also possible that many veterans that were not wounded in action and not disabled when discharged were
deemed eligible for the program by the board. While I do not have data on veterans that the board deemed
eligible, I do have data on whether a veteran participated in the program conditional on being eligible. I,
therefore, examine how participation in the rehabilitation program related to veterans’ wounds and disabilities.
I begin by dividing veterans into four mutually exclusive categories: (1) veterans that were not wounded in
action and not disabled when discharged; (2) veterans that were wounded in action but not disabled when
discharged; (3) veterans that were not wounded in action but were disabled when discharged; and (4) veterans
that were both wounded in action and disabled when discharged. Table 3 displays counts of veterans in each
category broken down by rehabilitation status for the 2,848 veterans for which I have rehabilitation data. Only
2.4 percent of veterans that were neither wounded nor disabled participated in the program. Fourteen percent
of veterans that were wounded in action participated in the program while 20 percent of veterans that were
disabled at discharge participated in the program. Seventy percent of veterans that were both wounded in
action and disabled at discharge participated in the vocational rehabilitation program. Thus,
being both wounded in action and disabled when discharged is a strong predictor for participating in the
program and, therefore, having been deemed eligible for the program by the Federal Board for Vocational
Education.

Table 3. Rehabilitation status by disability and wound status

Rehabilitated

Not
Percent
rehabilitated
rehabilitated
Not wounded in action and not disabled at discharge
61
2,469
0.024
Wounded in action, not disabled at discharge
16
95
0.144
Disabled at discharge, not wounded in action
34
131
0.206
Wounded in action and disabled at discharge
30
12
0.714
Total
141
2,707
0.05
Source: Data are from the Abstracts of World War I Military Service for the state of Missouri, which were
accessed from the Missouri Digital Heritage Collection (2020).
Notes: This table shows the number and percent of veterans that were rehabilitated based on disability status at
discharge from the army and wounds received in action.
Table 4 formalizes the results presented in table 3 through regression analyses. In these regressions the
dependent variable takes a value of one if the veteran was rehabilitated and a value of zero if the veteran was
not rehabilitated. Column (1) shows that being wounded, but not disabled, increased the probability of being
rehabilitated by 12 percentage points. Being disabled, but not wounded, increased the probability of being
rehabilitated by 18 percentage points. Being both wounded and disabled increased the probability of being
rehabilitated by an additional 39 percentage points. Thus, veterans that were both wounded and disabled were
69 percentage points more likely to have been rehabilitated than veterans that were not wounded and not
disabled. Column (2) repeats the specification from column (1), but now includes controls for years of education,
rank in the army, marital status, birthplace fixed effects, state of residence in 1940 fixed effects, and a quadratic
in age. The results remain almost identical after including these controls. Importantly, the coefficient 𝛽𝛽3 is
significantly different from the coefficients 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 in both columns of table 4. This implies that veterans that
were both wounded and disabled were significantly more likely to participate in the rehabilitation program than
veterans that were either one or the other.
Table 4. Wounded and disabled veterans and the likelihood of being rehabilitated
Pr (Rehabilitation = 1)
(1)
(2)
Wounded in action (𝛽𝛽1 )
0.120***
0.122***
(0.0335)
(0.0339)
Disabled at discharge (𝛽𝛽2 )
0.182***
0.179***
(0.0317)
(0.0312)
Wounded in action *disabled at discharge (𝛽𝛽3 )
0.388***
0.397***
(0.0836)
(0.0822)
Difference: Wounded and disabled – not wounded and disabled (𝛽𝛽1 +
0.690***
0.697***
𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3 )
(0.0698)
(0.0685)
Other controls
No
Yes
Observations
2,848
2,848
Sources: The rehabilitation information is from the United States Veterans Administration Master Index, 1917–
1940 provided by FamilySearch (2020). Information on wounds and disabilities are from the Abstracts of World
War I Military Service, which were accessed from the Missouri Digital Heritage Collection (2020).
Notes: This table provides estimates from a descriptive regression where a dummy variable for being
rehabilitated is the dependent variable. Column (2) controls for years of schooling (as a continuous variable), a
dummy variable if a veteran was part of the enlisted ranks (corporals, privates, and sergeants), a dummy
variable if a veteran was part of the specialist ranks (band leaders, buglers, cooks, farriers, mechanics, musicians,
saddlers, and wagoners), dummy variables for marital status (married spouse present, married spouse absent,

separated, divorced, widowed, and never married), fixed effects for birth state (or country if born outside
United States), fixed effects for state of residence in 1940, and a quadratic in age. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity. See text for more details on the dependent and independent variables of interest.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
The main results in this section provide strong evidence that being both wounded in action and disabled at
discharge is a strong proxy for participation in (and being eligible for) the vocational rehabilitation program. In
addition, being both wounded and disabled is a stronger predictor of program participation than being either
wounded or disabled, but not both.

Empirical Methodology
Motivated by the results in tables 3 and 4, I begin by analyzing differences in labor market outcomes for
veterans that were both wounded and disabled. To do this I adopt the following empirical specification:
(1)

𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟 ′ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

In equation (1) i indexes veterans and Outcomei is one of six labor market outcomes for veteran i in 1940. These
six outcomes are (1) a dummy variable indicating whether veteran i was in the labor force, (2) the log of a
veteran’s weekly wage, (3) the log of a veteran’s constructed income score, (4) the log of a veteran’s
occupational income score (OCC score), (5) a dummy variable indicating if veteran i was a laborer, and (6) a
dummy variable indicating whether veteran i was a white-collar worker, which I define as being a clerk,
manager, professional, or salesperson.
As mentioned in the “Historical Background” section, some veterans would have been eligible for a pension.
However, these pensions should not inflate weekly wages because census enumerators were instructed to
record nonwage, nonsalary income more than $50 (which would include pensions) in a separate category from
wage and salary income. I also use alternative measures of socioeconomic status, such as OCC score and
constructed income scores, which are determined by occupation rather than income. These alternative
measures should, therefore, not be impacted by a veteran receiving a pension.
OCC scores are a measure of occupational standing defined by IPUMS as “the median total income (in hundreds
of 1950 dollars) of all persons with that particular occupation in 1950” (Ruggles et al. Ruggles, Sarah, Ronald,
Josiah, Erin, Jose and Matthew 2020). The constructed income score is a measure of occupational standing that I
constructed following Collins and Wanamaker (Collins and Wanamaker 2017). This measure assigns an income
score to individuals in the same occupation, gender, race, region of residence, and worker type (self-employed
vs. wage worker) cell. This is a more granular measure of occupational standing than OCC scores and it allows
me to assign scores to individuals who were self-employed and farmers.8
Woundedi is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if veteran i was wounded in action during World War I
and Disabledi takes a value of one if veteran i was disabled when they were discharged from the army. Xi is a
vector of control variables that includes years of schooling (as a continuous variable), dummy variables
indicating the veteran’s rank in the army, dummy variables for marital status (married spouse present, married
spouse absent, separated, divorced, widowed, never married), fixed effects for state of birth (country if born
outside the United States), fixed effects for state of residence in 1940, and a quadratic in age. I divide veterans
into three separate ranks: commissioned officers (2nd lieutenants, 1st lieutenants, captains, majors, and
colonels), enlisted ranks (privates, corporals, and sergeants), and specialist ranks (band leaders, buglers, cooks,
farriers, mechanics, musicians, saddlers, and wagoners) and control for dummy variables for enlisted and

specialist ranks, omitting the variable for commissioned officers. Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is the error term and standard errors
are clustered at the occupation level.9

In equation (1) the coefficient 𝛽𝛽3 estimates the effect of being both wounded in action and disabled when
discharged on labor market outcomes. If being both wounded in action and disabled at discharge is as good as
randomly determined, then 𝛽𝛽3 measures the causal effect of this occurring to a veteran. Accordingly, it will pick
up any effect that disabled and wounded veterans might receive due to their eligibility for or participation in the
rehabilitation program. It will also pick up any other effects of being both wounded and disabled that is not
accounted for in the independent effects 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 . Stronger identifying assumptions are required for 𝛽𝛽3 to be
interpreted as the causal impact of being eligible for the rehabilitation program. These assumptions are
discussed in the “Results” section.
To provide some evidence in support of the random assignment assumption I run a descriptive regression where
the dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of one if the veteran was both wounded and disabled. This
regression is displayed in table 5. It appears that age, years of schooling, and birthplace do not predict being
both wounded and disabled.10 Unsurprisingly, veterans that had a specialist rank (band leaders, buglers, cooks,
farriers, mechanics, musicians, saddlers, and wagoners) were less likely to be both wounded and disabled
relative to veterans that were commissioned officers. While far from conclusive, table 5 offers suggestive
support for the assumption that being both wounded and disabled is as good as randomly determined.
Table 5. The likelihood of being wounded and disabled
Pr (Wounded and disabled = 1)
Age under 25 in 1920
-0.0000445
(0.00411)
Age 25 to 29 in 1920
0.00672
(0.00415)
Age 30 to 34 in 1920
0.00435
(0.00422)
Age 35 to 39 in 1920
0.00595
(0.00553)
Years of schooling
0.000112
(0.000142)
Enlist rank
0.000854
(0.00244)
Specialty rank
-0.00643**
(0.00292)
Born in Missouri
0.000615
(0.00128)
Observations
42,652
Sources: Data are from the 1940 US Census (age, years of schooling, birthplace) and the Abstracts of World War I
Military Service (military service information), which were accessed from the Missouri Digital Heritage Collection
(2020).
Notes: This table provides estimates from a descriptive regression where a dummy variable for being both
wounded and disabled is the dependent variable. The omitted age category is veterans that were 40 years or
older in 1920 and the omitted rank category are veterans that were commissioned officers. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity. See text for more details on the dependent and independent variables of interest.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Equation (1) is my preferred specification because it allows me to utilize the entire sample of linked Missouri
veterans. Nevertheless, it is also valuable to examine the impact of rehabilitation on veterans that were
rehabilitated. The following empirical specification uses the subsample of veterans for which I have
rehabilitation data:
(2)𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 × 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽5 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 × 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 × 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 ×
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟 ′ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

Equation (2) is similar to equation (1), but now contains a complete triple interaction if a veteran was wounded,
disabled, and rehabilitated. 𝛽𝛽3 measures the effect of participating in the rehabilitation program for veterans
that were not wounded and not disabled. Similarly, 𝛽𝛽5 measures the effect of participating in the program for
wounded veterans, 𝛽𝛽6 measures the effect of participation for disabled veterans, and 𝛽𝛽7 measures any
differential impact participation in the rehabilitation program had on veterans that were both wounded and
disabled. Note that these effects include any impact the program had on veterans along with any selection
effect from veterans choosing to participate in the program. Put differently, these coefficients measure the
effect of the program only if the veterans that participated in the program were as good as randomly selected.
While this assumption is unlikely to hold, if equation (2) is simply viewed as a descriptive regression, it can
inform us if veterans that participated in the program had better outcomes.11

Results
Results from estimating equation (1) are presented in table 6. Column (1) uses a dummy for whether a veteran
was in the labor force as the dependent variable. Veterans that were wounded in action, but not disabled at
discharge, had lower probabilities of being in the labor force. The same holds true for veterans that were
disabled at discharge but not wounded in action. However, veterans that were both wounded and disabled were
about 3 percentage points more likely to be in the labor force.

Table 6. Long-run outcomes for disabled and wounded veterans
Pr(Labor
Log(weekly Log(Constructed
Log(OCC
Pr(Laborer Pr(White
Force = 1)
wage)
income score)
score)
= 1)
collar = 1)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Wounded in action (𝛽𝛽1 )
-0.0295*
-0.0317*
0.00129
0.00190
-0.00459 -0.0113
-0.00147
-0.0259**
(0.0165)
(0.0181)
(0.0132)
(0.00870) (0.0121)
(0.00920) (0.00443) (0.0124)
Disabled at discharge (𝛽𝛽2 )
-0.0617*
-0.0647*** -0.363**
-0.0340** -0.0209* -0.0264** 0.00467
-0.0446***
(0.0366)
(0.0164)
(0.0145)
(0.0133)
(0.0123)
(0.0130)
(0.0126)
(0.0163)
Wounded in action *Disabled at
0.0301**
0.126**
0.0544*
0.0538**
0.0232
-0.00461
-0.0494*
0.0761
discharge (𝛽𝛽3 )
(0.0123)
(0.0487)
(0.0314)
(0.0270)
(0.0238)
(0.0349)
(0.0258)
(0.0251)
Observations
42,652
20,708
20,708
38,830
20,708
39,428
42,652
42,652
Sources: Data are from the 1940 US Census (labor market outcomes and years of schooling) and the Abstracts of World War I Military Service (military
service information), which were accessed from the Missouri Digital Heritage Collection (2020).
Notes: This table displays estimates for equation (1) in the text. All columns control for years of schooling (as a continuous variable), a dummy variable if
a veteran was part of the enlisted ranks (corporals, privates, and sergeants), a dummy variable if a veteran was part of the specialist ranks (band leaders,
buglers, cooks, farriers, mechanics, musicians, saddlers, and wagoners), dummy variables for marital status (married spouse present, married spouse
absent, separated, divorced, widowed, and never married), fixed effects for birth state (or country if born outside United States), fixed effects for state
of residence in 1940, and a quadratic in age. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level. See text for more details on the dependent and
independent variables of interest.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Column (2) uses the log of veterans’ weekly wages as the dependent variable. The 1940 census only records
income for wage workers and not for self-employed workers. Accordingly, I define weekly wages as a veteran’s
yearly income (in 1939) divided by the number of weeks they reported working (in 1939). I do this for wage
workers that worked 30 weeks or more in a year.12 Census enumerators were, also, instructed to code any wage
worker with an annual income more than $5,000 as having an income of $5,000. This practice was not
universally followed as there are many veterans for whom yearly income is more than $5,000. I follow Acemoglu
and Angrist (2000) and censor weekly wages at the 98th percentile. Weekly wages above the 98th percentile are
replaced with 1.5 times the 98th percentile wage.13 Thus, column (2) is conditional on being a wage worker and
working 30 or more weeks in a year. Being wounded in action but not disabled at discharge, and vice versa,
resulted in significantly lower weekly wages. However, being both wounded and disabled increased weekly
wages by about 13 percent.
Columns (3) and (4) use Collins and Wanamaker’s (Collins and Wanamaker 2017) measure of constructed
income for the dependent variable. Column (3) repeats the specification in column (2), while column (4) expands
the sample to include all veterans for which I was able to construct an income score. Column (4), therefore,
includes self-employed workers, farmers, and veterans that worked less than 30 weeks in a year. In both
columns, being disabled at discharge significantly decreases the constructed income score, while being both
wounded and disabled increases the constructed income score by about 5 percent.
Columns (5) and (6) use OCC scores as the dependent variable. Column (5) repeats the specification in column
(2), while column (6) expands the sample to include all veterans that have an OCC score. Disabled veterans have
significantly lower OCC scores, but there is no significant effect for veterans that were both wounded and
disabled. Finally, columns (7) and (8) use occupational categories as the dependent variable. Column (7) shows
that veterans that were both wounded in action and disabled at discharge were significantly less likely to be
laborers, occupations that usually commanded lower wages and status. Column (8) shows that veterans that
were both wounded and disabled were significantly more likely to be white-collar workers, which normally
commanded higher wages and status.
Table 6 demonstrates that veterans that were either wounded in action or disabled at discharge, but not both,
had significantly worse labor market outcomes than their nonwounded, nondisabled peers (𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 ). In
contrast, veterans that were both wounded in action and disabled at discharge had significantly better labor
market outcomes (𝛽𝛽3 ).

Can this positive effect be attributed to the high percentage of wounded and disabled veterans that were
eligible for and participated in the rehabilitation program? Additional identifying assumptions, besides random
assignment, are needed to attribute the entire magnitude of the coefficient to rehabilitation eligibility. In
particular, assume (1) that all veterans that were both wounded and disabled were eligible for the rehabilitation
program and (2) that after accounting for the independent effects of being wounded or disabled (𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 ), the
only impact that being both wounded and disabled had on long-run outcomes was through rehabilitation
eligibility.4 If these assumptions, including random assignment, hold then the coefficient 𝛽𝛽3 can be interpreted
as the effect, for wounded and disabled veterans, of being eligible for the rehabilitation program.
Assumption (1) in the preceding paragraph is likely to hold. Because all veterans that participated in the
rehabilitation program had to be eligible for it (by definition), the minimum percentage of wounded and
disabled veterans that were eligible for the program was 70 percent (table 3). In addition, about half those who
were deemed eligible for the rehabilitation program participated in it (180,000 joined the program out of the
337,000 that were eligible). The fact that more than half of the veterans that were both wounded and disabled
participated in the program, coupled with the information on the criteria for eligibility presented in the
“Historical Background” section, supports the first assumption. Assumption (2) in the preceding paragraph is,

unfortunately, untestable. However, even if assumption (2) does not hold, it is possible that some portion of the
positive effect of being both wounded in action and disabled when discharged is due to the rehabilitation
program.
Results from estimating equation (2) are presented in table 7, which is set up analogously to table 6. The
number of observations in table 7 is considerably less than in table 6 and, accordingly, the estimates are less
precise. This is because it is only possible to estimate equation (2) on veterans for which I collected
rehabilitation data. Nevertheless, several trends are noticeable. First, and consistent with table 6, veterans that
were either wounded in action or disabled at discharge, but not both, have worse labor market outcomes with
significant coefficients in a few instances (𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 ). Second, veterans that were either wounded or disabled
and rehabilitated saw improved labor market outcomes, with the coefficients being significant in a number of
cases (𝛽𝛽5 and 𝛽𝛽6 ). Finally, the estimates for the triple interaction are extremely noisy, but they show that
veterans that were both wounded in action and disabled at discharge did not experience a differential impact
from being rehabilitated (𝛽𝛽7 ). This is not inconsistent with the results in table 6 as veterans that were wounded
in action, disabled at discharge, and rehabilitated still receive the positive effect of being wounded and
rehabilitated (𝛽𝛽5 ) and disabled and rehabilitated (𝛽𝛽6 ).

Table 7. Long-run outcomes for disabled, wounded, and rehabilitated veterans
Pr(Labor
Log(weekly
Log(Constructed
Log(OCC
Pr(Laborer Pr(White
Force = 1)
wage)
income score)
score)
= 1)
collar = 1)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Wounded in action (𝛽𝛽1 )
-0.0683***
-0.216**
-0.0548
0.0331
-0.0600
-0.0267
-0.0219
0.0187
(0.0225)
(0.103)
(0.0670)
(0.0336)
(0.0421)
(0.0427)
(0.0207)
(0.0460)
Disabled at discharge (𝛽𝛽2 )
-0.0656**
-0.0592
-0.0790
-0.0289
-0.0692
-0.0599
-0.00592
-0.0427
(0.0303)
(0.0849)
(0.0536)
(0.0336)
(0.0428)
(0.0412)
(0.0237)
(0.0324)
Rehabilitated (𝛽𝛽3 )
-0.0871
-0.0764
-0.0739
-0.0301
-0.0869
-0.00849
-0.0251
-0.0379
(0.0603)
(0.112)
(0.0771)
(0.0380)
(0.0669)
(0.0332)
(0.0267)
(0.0528)
Wounded in action*Disabled at
-0.115
0.0930
-0.0894
-0.00539
-0.0979
0.0853
-0.0112
-0.0379
discharge (β4)
(0.105)
(0.420)
(0.312)
(0.137)
(0.290)
(0.141)
(0.0881)
(0.115)
Wounded in action*Rehabilitated
-0.00659
0.561***
0.280*
0.0218
0.141
0.0412
-0.0226
-0.138
(𝛽𝛽5 )
(0.0811)
(0.214)
(0.168)
(0.152)
(0.177)
(0.147)
(0.0412)
(0.131)
Disabled at
0.0220
0.337
0.327**
0.131
0.244*
0.0665
-0.0675
0.111
discharge*Rehabilitated (𝛽𝛽6 )
(0.0481)
(0.228)
(0.145)
(0.0819)
(0.127)
(0.108)
(0.0437)
(0.0747)
Wounded in action*Disabled at
0.289*
-0.700
-0.428
-0.157
-0.134
-0.217
0.0470
0.0619
discharge*Rehabilitated (𝛽𝛽7 )
(0.155)
(0.455)
(0.340)
(0.196)
(0.282)
(0.189)
(0.1000)
(0.172)
Observations
2,848
1,345
1,345
2,565
1,345
2,617
2,848
2,848
Sources: Data are from the 1940 US Census (labor market outcomes and years of schooling) and the Abstracts of World War I Military Service (military
service information), which were accessed from the Missouri Digital Heritage Collection (2020). The rehabilitation information is from the United States
Veterans Administration Master Index, 1917–1940 provided by FamilySearch (2020).
Notes: This table displays estimates for equation (2) in the text. All columns control for years of schooling (as a continuous variable), a dummy variable if
a veteran was part of the enlisted ranks (corporals, privates, and sergeants), a dummy variable if a veteran was part of the specialist ranks (band leaders,
buglers, cooks, farriers, mechanics, musicians, saddlers, and wagoners), dummy variables for marital status (married spouse present, married spouse
absent, separated, divorced, widowed, and never married), fixed effects for birth state (or country if born outside United States), fixed effects for state
of residence in 1940, and a quadratic in age. Standard errors are clustered at the occupation level. See text for more details on the dependent and
independent variables of interest.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

As mentioned in the “Empirical Methodology” section, the coefficients 𝛽𝛽3 , 𝛽𝛽5 , 𝛽𝛽6 , and 𝛽𝛽 7 include any effect
the program had on veterans along with any selection effect from veterans choosing to participate in the
program. Despite not being able to disentangle the rehabilitation effect from the selection effect, the results in
table 7 are encouraging. In particular, veterans that were wounded or disabled and participated in the
rehabilitation program appear to have improved labor market outcomes.

Conclusion
This article examined the impact of vocational rehabilitation on the labor market outcomes of wounded and
disabled World War I veterans from the state of Missouri. To do this, I constructed a new dataset that contains
information on World War I veterans’ military service, rehabilitation status, and long-run labor market
outcomes. I find that veterans that were both wounded and disabled were, by far, the most likely to be eligible
for, and participate in, the rehabilitation program. I conclude that rehabilitation was likely successful based on
two pieces of evidence. First, veterans that were both wounded and disabled had improved labor market
outcomes. Second, for the subset of veterans for which I have actual rehabilitation data, it appears that
rehabilitation improved labor market outcomes for wounded and disabled veterans relative to their peers that
were not rehabilitated.
There are two important conclusions that can be drawn from this article. First, veterans’ wartime experiences
matter. In particular, the results from this article demonstrate that wartime experiences can result in large
differences in labor market outcomes for veterans that fought in the same war. This extends the previous
literature that focused on the return to military service without paying much attention to heterogenous wartime
experiences. Second, this article demonstrates that rehabilitation programs can be effective at returning
wounded and disabled veterans to some semblance of a normal life. If the estimates in table 6 are taken
seriously then the program appears to have been incredibly successful at returning veterans that were both
wounded and disabled to gainful employment. In particular, veterans that were both wounded and disabled
ended up having labor market outcomes similar to their nonwounded, nondisabled peers (the linear
combination of coefficients 𝛽𝛽1 , 𝛽𝛽2 , and 𝛽𝛽3 in table 6).

A full cost-benefit analysis of the World War I vocational rehabilitation program is beyond the scope of this
article. However, it is possible to get an estimate of the total benefits of the program through a back of the
envelop calculation. The average rehabilitated veteran in my sample had a weekly wage of $31 in 1940 and
worked 43 weeks. Assume, based on table 6, that veterans that were both wounded and disabled would have
had weekly wages that were 13 percent lower in the absence of the rehabilitation program. Applying this
estimate to the 129,000 veterans that completed the program reveals that the benefit of the program was
about $22 million in 1940.15 Dillingham (Dillingham 1952) estimates the cost of the program, without stipends
(which would have been paid in the absence of the program), at $135 million. Adjusting the yearly cost of the
program for inflation means that the program would have cost around $110 million in 1940.16 Thus,
rehabilitated veterans would need to receive labor market benefits for about 5 years to recuperate the entire
costs of the program. Most veterans likely exceeded this 5-year criterion because they were fairly young when
they were rehabilitated.
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Footnotes

1 The wounded-to-dead ratio for the Mexican–American War, Civil War, and Spanish American War were all less
than one (0.31, 0.77, and 0.66, respectively), while the wounded-to-dead ratio for World War I, World
War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom
were all greater than one (1.75, 1.65, 2.82, 2.63, 8.58, and 9.19, respectively). See Blum and DeBruyne’s
(2020) “American War and Military Operations Causalities: Lists and Statistics” for wounded and dead
figures. Exact wound and dead figures are not available for the American Revolutionary War and the
War of 1812, but estimates suggest wounded-to-dead ratios less than 1 (Hickey, 2006).
2 An example of the second group would be a veteran who was wounded in action, but the wound was not
serious enough to result in a disability. An example of the third group would be a veteran that suffered a
noncombat injury during their military service that resulted in a disability.
3 Due to limited resources, no records of veteran placements were kept. Many veterans were offered
employment by the firm with which they trained.
4 Prior to 1919 eligibility had to be determined by both the Bureau of War Risk Insurance and the Board for
Vocational Education (Dillingham 1952). The bureau would first determine if a veteran was eligible for
disability compensation and then the board would determine if the veteran was eligible for
rehabilitation.
5 I would like to thank John Parman for his help collecting this data.
6 See Abramitzky et al. (2020) for an automated probabilistic approach that uses the Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm. The ABE method used in Abramitzky et al. (2012), Abramitzky et al. (2014), and
Abramitzky et al. (2019a) is the approach used in this article. Bailey et al. (2020) and Bailey (2018) use a
semiautomated approach that involves both computer programming and human input. Finally, see
Feigenbaum (2016) for a machine learning approach to record linking.
7 It is possible that the veterans who were not found (19%) never applied for veteran benefits.
8 See Collins and Wanamaker (2017) and their appendix for more details on how to construct this measure.
9 I would, ideally, cluster standard errors at the level of the unit a veteran served with because many veterans
form social networks in their units that might later impact their likelihood of participating in
rehabilitation (see Laschever [2013] and Costa and Kahn [2010] for the impacts that friendship during
miliary service can have on later life labor market and health outcomes). However, the unit a veteran
served with is not available in my data. I, therefore, selected to cluster my standard errors at the
occupation level because any unobservable errors affecting labor market outcomes are likely correlated
within an occupation. This also follows the advice in Cameron and Miller (2015) who suggest using broad
groups to cluster.
10 The omitted age category is veterans that were 40 years or older in 1920.
11 It is possible to instrument for participation in the rehabilitation program with being both wounded and
disabled, while controlling for being either wounded or disabled, using the subsample of veterans for
which I have rehabilitation data. I have done this, but the results are extremely noisy, perhaps due to
the loss in efficiency from the two-stage least squares estimator. Accordingly, I adopt equation (2) for
this subsample despite the obvious limitations.
12 Veterans that worked 30 or more weeks a year likely had steady jobs. The results do not change when I drop
this assumption or increase it to 40 or more weeks a year.
13 The 98th percentile wage in my sample is $96.15. Wages above this are replaced with 1.5 times $96.15, or
$144.22.
14 These assumptions are similar to the assumptions one would make if they wanted to instrument for
participation in the rehabilitation program with being both wounded and disabled while controlling for
being either wounded or disabled. I cannot use an instrumental variable approach in table 6 because I

do not have information on rehabilitation status for all 42,652 veterans. I can use an instrumental
variable approach for the subsample of veterans for which I have rehabilitation status, but, as already
mentioned, these estimates are extremely noisy.
15 This estimate is obtained as follows:
$31\ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝\ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘\ \𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡\ 0.13\ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟\ \𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡\ 43\ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤\ \𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡\ 129,000\ 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣\ =
\ $22,354,410 .
16 The program incurred the following costs in the years 1920–28: $35 million (1920), $99 million (1921), $166
million (1922), $150 million (1923), $107 million (1924), $61 million (1925), $26 million (1926), and $2
million (1927). I decrease the cost of the program in each year by 79 percent, which was the amount of
the stipends, and then adjust the remaining amount to 1940 dollars using the CPI provided by Officer
and Williamson (2020). Inflation was very high in the years after World War I, which is why the nominal
cost of the program is less than the real cost of the program in 1940.
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